I. INTRODUCTION
Speculators borrow money to purchase a house in Newport Beach, California.
They make no down payment, and fail to make any of the mortgage payments. After a few months, the lender, a local savings and loan association, forecloses, selling the house at auction for well under the purchase price (though more than the mortgage). The borrowers then file for bankruptcy, and, in the bankruptcy proceeding, try to invalidate the foreclosure sale as a fraudulent transfer, arguing that the house was worth substantially more than the sales price. After the lower courts dismissed the borrowers' claim, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit conflict. Following full briefing and argument, the Court held in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation 1 that a bankruptcy court does not have the power to overturn a real property foreclosure that is properly conducted under state law.
The case involved interpretation of a provision of the Bankruptcy Code that permits a bankruptcy trustee (or debtor-in-possession) to avoid certain transfers of property if the debtor "received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer." 2 Thus, the legal question in BFP was whether the consideration received in a foreclosure sale constitutes "reasonably equivalent value" as a matter of law, without respect to whether the amount approximated the ordinary fair market value. I represented the Resolution Trust Corporation in the Supreme Court, arguing that bankruptcy courts
should not have the power to second-guess the bidding that takes place at regularly conducted and noncollusive foreclosure sales without clearer language to that effect in the Bankruptcy Code.
3 1 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
2 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i).
3 My account is influenced by my own participation in the case. For more objective accounts, see Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence Through a Bankruptcy Lens: A Study in the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 47 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 70-77 (1996) (suggesting that the opinion evidences Justice Scalia's discomfort at the nontextualist approach and would have been better served by more frank pragmatism); Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and Creditors 571 (5 th ed. 2005) (expressing ambivalence about the policies served by the outcome and amusement at the "dueling plain meanings" urged in the competing opinions).
Yet even I can readily acknowledge that the most natural reading of the statute would support some assessment of the price received at the sale. Thus, from my perspective, this case presents a conflict between policy and the result that follows most naturally from the statute. Considering the nature of that conflict, it might come as a surprise that Justice Scalia is the author of the more holistic opinion, which gives priority to institutional concerns. In this case, it is Justice Souter who provides the strongly worded dissent peppered with a biting reliance on the plain language of the statute.
However, before I discuss that opinion in detail, I provide some background on the history of the legal issue. Then, I turn back to the case itself, emphasizing the facts of the underlying transactions, the lower court decisions, and the Supreme Court opinions and the process by which those opinions were issued. Finally, placing the Court's decision in the broader context of bankruptcy decision-making, I emphasize two features of the case and its background. The first is the aftermath of the S&L crisis of the 1980's, which aligned the federal government with the interests of secured creditors in bankruptcy cases. The second is the perspective the Court holds on bankruptcy law -a narrow, insular, and technical area, in which the Court's general approach is to minimize conflicts associated with unduly broad applications of bankruptcy powers.
II. FORECLOSURE AS A FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
Like many bankruptcy cases, BFP presents a conflict between the powers of a bankruptcy court and rights under a separate legal regime. On the one hand, bankruptcy law generally requires that creditors suffer equally from a debtor's financial distress. Among other things, this means that one creditor should not profit to the detriment of other creditors through transactions with a distressed debtor before formal bankruptcy proceedings begin. 5 Thus, bankruptcy law prohibits both transfers that the debtor makes fraudulently or for inadequate consideration (both are called fraudulent transfers), 6 and payments that the debtor makes to creditors shortly before bankruptcy (labeled preferences).
7
On the other hand, real property law provides rules that specify when, and under what circumstances, conveyances become final. Even though foreclosure prices are often just a fraction of the sales prices achieved through other types of market transactions, those rules generally prohibit challenges to foreclosure sales based solely on price. 8 The rationale is that rules interfering with the finality of foreclosure sales make it harder for third parties to bid and thus depress the prices received at those sales. Thus, the market for distressed real property could suffer if the purchaser's title depends upon a judge's after-the-fact determination of a "fair" valuation of the property.
The bankruptcy and real property regimes potentially conflict when property of a distressed borrower is sold at a foreclosure sale for substantially less than its fair market value and that borrower later goes bankrupt. Invalidating such a sale would further the 5 Baird, supra note 4, ch. 7; Warren & Westbrook, supra note 3, at 484-510.
6 11 U.S.C. § 548.
7 11 U.S.C. § 547. rd § 8.3. Given the reality of low-price foreclosure sales, the debtor's recourse is to protect itself either by bidding for the property up to a fair value at the foreclosure sale or by selling the property in a consensual transaction before the foreclosure and applying the proceeds against the debt. See generally Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 159 (1997) .
interests of non-foreclosing creditors in maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate, at least in a case in which the property was worth more than the total amount due to the foreclosing creditor. At the same time, invalidating such a sale would interfere with the ability of the secured-credit system to redeploy collateral to a solvent owner in an expeditious manner. Rules that lengthen the period when collateral remains in the hands of the distressed borrower impose costs by interfering with the effective rehabilitation and use of land and improvements.
The question is whether fraudulent transfer rules under the bankruptcy regime apply to foreclosure sales that the real property regime validates. The problem is complicated somewhat by the long history of rules banning and invalidating fraudulent transfers, which predate the first bankruptcy statute by centuries. Thus, they have been, and remain, a common feature of state law, parallel to the applicable provisions of the 13 See NCCUSL UFTA Summary, supra note 10.
14 UFCA § 4 (transfers without "fair consideration"); UFTA § 3 (transfers without "reasonably equivalent value").
15 See NCCUSL UFTA Summary. 16 See UFCA § 1 (definition of "Conveyance" that does not refer to "involuntary" actions).
concluded that it nevertheless extended to foreclosure and execution sales, at least in cases where the sales or underlying loans were alleged to be collusive.
17
Responding to those rulings, both the UFTA and the Bankruptcy Code make it plain that their avoidance powers extend to involuntary transfers. 18 Because foreclosure sales typically do not bring high prices, the natural question arises whether such a sale can be overturned as a fraudulent conveyance. In the language of both the UFTA and the Bankruptcy Code, the issue is whether the sale returns a "reasonably equivalent value"
for the transferred asset. 18 See the definitions of "transfer" in UFTA § 1(12) and Bankruptcy Code § 101(54). Congress added the reference to "involuntary" transfers in Section 101 in 1984. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 463(a), 98 Stat. 333, 378-79 . As discussed below, the BFP Court held in substance that the purpose of those amendments was to ensure that bankruptcy courts could invalidate collusive foreclosure sales. 511 U.S. at 543 n.7. As Justice Souter points out, that reading closely resembles a bill that Congress considered, but did not enact. S. 445, 98 th Cong., 1 st Sess. § 360 (1983) (protecting noncollusive foreclosure sales) (discussed in 511 U.S. at 554 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting)). Thus, Congress arguably rejected the position espoused by the majority and codified in the UFTA. 19 The term, which is not used elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code, appears to derive from the references to "fair equivalent" value in Bankruptcy Act § 67d, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1976) (repealed 1978 ] into a cocked hat"); Warren & Westbrook, supra note 3, at 571 (characterizing Durrett as a "judicial bombshell"). The Supreme Court in BFP characterized Durrett as "unprecedented," explaining that "[t]o our knowledge no prior decision had ever applied the 'grossly inadequate price' badge of fraud under fraudulent transfer law to set aside a foreclosure sale." 511 U.S. at 542. 26 Although Durrett troubled insurers and likely affected the market for distressed real estate, I doubt that it affected the Texas real estate market more broadly. The institutional lenders that I represented during that time did adopt policies of bidding 70% of the appraised value in foreclosure sales. But the limited ex ante likelihood that a loan would lead to a foreclosure sale that would be followed by a bankruptcy with a colorable Durrett claim makes it difficult to believe that those lenders raised interest rates or otherwise limited the extension of credit.
27 See Texas Department of Insurance, Form T-1, Exclusions from Coverage 5, at 4 (Jan. things, for example, the record makes it quite clear that the borrowers did not plan to occupy the home, but to flip it. Thus, the Pedersens transferred the property to BFP as part of the transaction in which they borrowed funds from Imperial to pay to the Foremans. 43 Also, the record makes it clear that the newspaper reports about Pedersen's fraudulent activity occurred weeks before Imperial made the loan -those reports were serious enough to convince the Foremans to alter the deal but apparently did not concern Imperial's loan officer.
44
To put the lender's diligence in context, it is useful to recite a few facts about what was going on with Imperial during this time. During the early 1980's, Imperial had been one of the nation's largest thrift holding companies, but the mismatch between the high rates it paid on deposits and the low rates it earned on mortgages gave it a negative 41 See James Granelli, Partners Take Gamble -And Lose, Los Angeles Times, May 24, 1994, at D1. 42 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, An Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s, 29-31 (1999) (suggesting that risky lending was responsible for a large share of the S&L crisis); see George E. Ruth, Commercial Lending 99 (1999) (discussing importance of "character" in commercial lending). 43 Because loans on investment purchases of real estate tend to be riskier than loans on owner-occupied real estate, many savings and loan associations are unwilling to make such loans. 44 The opinion acknowledged that the Seventh Circuit's approach presented a "persuasive" "plain-language interpretation" of the statute, but rejected that approach based on the conclusion that "broader considerations require a different result." Rev. 933 (1985) ). 59 The FDIC and RTC were two of the largest creditors in foreclosure proceedings in Texas, which was one of the locations hit hardest by the S&L crisis. The application of the Durrett rule in the Fifth Circuit (which includes Texas) made it plausible for the RTC and the In hindsight, reasonable minds can differ about the importance of the question. In truth, the question can be presented only in a reasonably unusual situation marked by considerable volatility in real-estate prices. First, the property has to be sold at foreclosure at a time when the property's value is relatively low. If the property were known to be valuable at the time of foreclosure, the debtor typically could prevent the foreclosure by filing for bankruptcy before the sale rather than afterwards. Then, the property would have to appreciate substantially and rapidly. The increase has to be large enough to produce a value that would repay the loan of the foreclosing lender and produce a surplus sufficient to justify the litigation costs; the increase has to be rapid enough to support a bankruptcy filing sufficiently soon after the foreclosure sale to permit a challenge in the bankruptcy court. The existence of the circuit conflict shows that the scenario is not wholly unrealistic, but at the same time, it is fair to say that the facts are atypical.
Despite the RTC's concession, the available files (currently only the file of Justice Blackmun) 60 show that the pool memorandum (prepared by one of Justice White's clerks) recommended that the Court deny review. The concern of the law clerks was that the case might be moot. Even if the Court did overturn the decision of the Ninth Circuit, it is not clear that the bankruptcy court could provide meaningful relief to BFP.
61
FDIC to take advantage of the opportunity to get a case before the Court in which Durrett might be overturned. 60 Justice Blackmun's file is available in the Library of Congress in Box 637 of Justice Blackmun's papers. 61 The concern was that Osborne (the purchaser at the foreclosure sale) already had sold the property. The law clerks, at least, were persuaded that Section 550(a) would permit the Influenced by that problem, Justice Blackmun voted to deny the petition. Ultimately, however, the Court granted review.
At the argument, the most active questioners were Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Souter. Interrupting petitioner's counsel at the beginning of the argument, Justice Scalia suggested that it was senseless to place a value on foreclosed property that ignored that the property would be sold at foreclosure. If you're willing to individualize [at all], why not go all the way and say, this is not only property of a sort that's being sold at a foreclosure sale, but is property that's being sold on a rainy Tuesday when some of the best buyers in town are on summer vacation? * * * * It is property that is subject to foreclosure under certain State rules * * * and whatever it fetches under those rules has to be the fair value of that particularly individuated property. 1993 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 114 *5, *10 (attribution to Justice Scalia based on author's personal recollection). 63 Speaking to counsel for the RTC, he asked: "I have difficulty squaring your argument, I admit, with the language of the statute * * * * It seems to me that if [you are right] they took a very obtuse way to require that." 1993 U.S. Trans LEXIS 114, *25, *31. Speaking to counsel for Osborne, he explained: "[T]he trouble, it seems to me, with your argument is that if the phrase in question * * * means nothing more than you say it does * * * it would have been infinitely simpler for Congress simply to say that a bona fide sale conducted in accordance with the requirements of State statutory or common law will be conclusively presumed to realize a fair or sufficient value." 1993 U.S. Trans LEXIS 114, *38-*39. 64 Speaking to petitioner's counsel, she asked: "[I]f we accept your condition -position, wouldn't one of the practical effects be to mean that you could get -a seller could get still less at a foreclosure sale because it would be relatively more easy to upset the result of a foreclosure sale?" 1993 U.S. Trans LEXIS 114, *16. Speaking to counsel for the RTC, she sought a detailed explanation of ways in which foreclosure sales differed from voluntary sales. 1993 U.S. Trans LEXIS 114, *20-*21.
At conference on the Friday after the argument, the Justices were closely divided.
Five Justices voted to affirm and four Justices were set on reversal. But among the Justices voting to affirm, there was considerable doubt about how to explain the decision.
The Chief Justice, for example, would have accepted a rebuttable presumption, apparently one that would extend to all sales that could not be overturned under state law. Rev. 593, 597 (1992) . Here, the Justices were debating how much reliance the Court needed to place on a plain-statement rule to justify the tacitly admitted departure from the plain meaning of the statute. Justice O'Connor seemed to think a great deal of reliance was required. Justice Kennedy, in contrast, seemed to think both that very little reliance was necessary and that the federalism concerns raised by BFP were inadequate to justify application of a strong plain-statement rule. And it is no more realistic to ignore that characteristic of the property (the fact that state foreclosure law permits the mortgagee to sell it at forced sale) than it is to ignore other price-affecting characteristics (such as the fact that state zoning law permits the owner of the neighboring lot to open a gas station). Justice Souter's dissent calls the Court to account for "derogation" from "the straightforward language used by Congress." 72 He starts by characterizing the decision as "hold[ing] that * * * a peppercorn paid at a non-collusive and procedurally regular "reasonably equivalent value." As emphasized in the RTC's brief, the term "reasonably equivalent" value is a unique term in the Bankruptcy Code. Although the Court recognized that "reasonably equivalent" value is not the same thing as "fair market value," nothing in the statute compelled the Court to infer that any objective post hoc assessment of "value" was irrelevant. 70 511 U.S. at 539-40. As discussed above, the desultory tone of this section of the opinion apparently is attributable to deletions made to accommodate Justice Kennedy. 71 75 Although Justice Souter's discussion of the language of the statute is compelling, his discussion of bankruptcy policy is less impressive, primarily because it does not match the facts of the case. First, the idea that reversal of the Ninth Circuit would further a fresh start is a considerable stretch, given the likelihood in most cases that any value recovered would go to unsecured creditors and attorney's fees. That is particularly true in this case, where Wayne Pedersen was a fugitive from justice throughout the bankruptcy proceeding and the Supreme Court's process. Similarly, because no creditors appeared to complain about unfavorable treatment, Justice Souter's concern about equitable distribution among creditors seems off point. A third point relates to Justice Souter's views about the foreclosure process. He suggests that the mortgagee's interests are best served if the foreclosure sale is poorly attended, because then the lender is more likely to take the property by bidding the amount of the indebtedness and retain the profits from resale. In BFP, however, as in Durrett, the winning bidder was an unrelated third party. More broadly, Justice Souter's argument assumes what is often untrue, that the collateral is worth substantially more than the debt. See Mann, supra note 8 (case studies on commercial foreclosures documenting how rarely lenders resell collateral for more than the underlying debt).
contended that "the bankruptcy court must compare the price received by the insolvent debtor and the worth of the item when sold and set aside the transfer if the former was substantially ('[un] reasonably') 'less than' the latter." 76 In his view, this reading is much more faithful to the statutory language than a reading that has "reasonably equivalent value" turn solely on procedure.
77

IV. THE SUPREME COURT, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
What can the decision in BFP teach us about the Supreme Court's approach to bankruptcy law? My thesis is that BFP reflects the Court's resistance to expanding the bankruptcy system to interfere with other legal systems. When the bankruptcy regime threatens to transgress rights and expectations founded in other bodies of law, the Court tends toward the "use of a strong interpretive principle" to narrow the substantive reach of the Code. 78 That is not to say, of course, that the Court has never upheld broad applications of the bankruptcy laws. 79 It is to say, however, that the Court's baseline perception is one of doubt. 80 76 He remarked: "Nor would any ordinary English speaker, concerned to determine whether a foreclosure sale was collusive or procedurally irregular * * * direct an adjudicator * * * to ascertain whether the sale had realized 'less than a "reasonably equivalent value"' * * * ." 511 U.S. at 573-74 (Souter, J., dissenting). 77 511 U.S. at 552 (Souter, J., dissenting).
78 Ronald J. Mann, The Rise of State Bankruptcy-Directed Legislation, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1805, 1808 (2004) (explaining that the Court's typical deference to legitimate state regulation should not extend to state laws that are primarily directed at affecting bankruptcy outcomes). 79 In general, it is clear that the Bankruptcy Code gives bankruptcy courts much greater power than they had under the old Bankruptcy Act. See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 3, at 110-11. Thus, from the perspective of practitioners under the Act, decisions in early cases like NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984) (bankruptcy court can reject collective bargaining agreement), and Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (bankruptcy court can discharge Thus, the Court's decisions evince a decided willingness to defer to important governmental interests on which the bankruptcy power otherwise might intrude. This is where the role of the Solicitor General becomes crucial. In my view, the posture that the Solicitor General has taken in bankruptcy cases over time has had a cognizable effect on the decisions that the Court in fact has rendered. The Court of course does not always defer to governmental interests. Still, when the Solicitor General can convince the Court that its position is reasonable and that a contrary outcome would harm important interests, the Court is likely to give the benefit of the doubt to the Solicitor General's narrower interpretation, even when (as in BFP) that result does considerable injury to the language of the statute. Indeed, I think that is more likely to be true in bankruptcy cases than in other private law cases, because the Solicitor General's view is less likely to reflect the agency bias that will be apparent in cases in which an agency defends its own programs.
Because my premise is that a complete explanation of the decision in BFP should account for the role that the Solicitor General played, it is interesting to provide some environmental injunction), would have seemed shocking, however much the language of the Code compelled them. 80 My original view was that the Court simply has little interest in bankruptcy cases. Yet I found that view hard to reconcile with the pattern of the cases. Most of the cases that are conspicuously atextual point in a single direction, which supports bankruptcy skepticism rather than a lack of interest. Moreover, the high rate of close cases (11 of 59 cases had at least 3 dissenting votes) is difficult to reconcile with apathy. Finally, my experience as a law clerk makes me think that the Justices are not disinterested in the cases, but perhaps just more sympathetic towards and familiar with the legal systems that govern foreclosures, criminal penalties, corporate governance and the like than they are with the importance of a coherent bankruptcy regime. For example, Justice O'Connor had a personal experience with the foreclosure process, which might have disposed her to value finality. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR & H. ALAN DAY, LAZY B x, 95 (2002) (providing a fascinating discussion of her family's efforts to foreclose on a defaulting ranch hand who was given an interest in the family ranch). 
A. Agency Cases
In agency cases, the Solicitor General typically appears on behalf of a federal regulatory agency whose interests are threatened by a bankruptcy stay or discharge. Corporation presage a period in the not-too-distant future in which the Solicitor General properly might become a leading advocate for unsecured creditors.
When BFP is viewed in this context, the effectiveness of the SG's participation in these cases is noteworthy. 115 I do not think that participation can be regarded as effective solely because the Solicitor General prevails in a large share of the cases in which it appears, because the Solicitor General is free to decline to participate in any case in which the position that furthers a government interest appears too weak to defend. However, when the Solicitor General embarks on a practice of appearing to defend an interest in almost every case in which that interest is before the Court, and when the side that the Solicitor General defends prevails in every case, there is some reason to think that the Solicitor General's appearance is relevant to the outcome. the Solicitor General did not argue on their behalf. Of even greater interest, the three periods discussed above map surprisingly well with the Court's decisions in those cases: the only period in the Court's history in which secured creditors have won reliably is the period in which the Solicitor General consistently appeared in the Court on their behalf. 
SC Wins
My discussion is of course speculative, and not readily susceptible of proof.
Certainly many factors influence Supreme Court decisions other than the views of the Solicitor General. There plainly is a selection bias as well -the Solicitor General has considerable control over the cases that come before the Court when the United States is a party, and in other cases, the Solicitor General need not participate if the arguments on the "government" side are unappealing.
In addition, the question of "deference" is tied up with the merits of the cases that come before the Court. Those who think the analysis in BFP and Dewsnup is transparently correct 116 will see no reason to credit the Solicitor General's appearance in those cases as promoting positions to which the Court might have wished to defer. I do think, however, that the discussion above offers good reason to think that in close casesand BFP certainly was a close case -the views of the Solicitor General will be important to the Court's final decision. Most importantly, in both of those cases the position articulated by the Solicitor General was one that would play to the Court's general skepticism about bankruptcy powers -an argument that the Bankruptcy Code should be interpreted to permit as little interference as possible with the ordinary course of a secured creditor's enforcement of its security interest.
V. CONCLUSION
The discussion above is intentionally loose and hypothetical. To summarize, I see the Bankruptcy Code as a relatively unusual type of legislation -a broad and intentionally transformative piece of legislation without any dominant agency support in the Executive Branch. 117 The lack of a strong agency to enforce and interpret the Code has had two related effects on the jurisprudence under the Code. First, it has left the Court to discern for itself the importance of bankruptcy policy, the result being that the Court has a much less forceful sense of the Code's importance than it has for parallel legislation in fields like environmental law, labor law, and pension regulation. At the same time, the lack of an agency focused on the Code has meant that the federal interest in bankruptcy cases in most cases has come from some other legal regime, and thus has tended to support a less intrusive interpretation of the Code, not the broad interpretation that administering agencies typically develop. Together, those two effects have resulted in a jurisprudence exemplified by BFP's adoption of a reading of the Code much narrower than the plain language would suggest.
